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Abstract - In this study, a practical card-emulated relay 
attack is implemented on Near Field Communication (NFC) 
equipped mobile devices. NFC is a promising 
communication technology which is also used in smart 
mobile devices. As an effective and flexible communication 
technology, NFC is frequently used in innovative solutions 
nowadays such as payments, access control etc. Because of 
the nature of these transactions, security is a critical issue 
that should be considered in system design and development 
phases. Although inherited from Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) technology, NFC security needs, 
requirements and solutions differ in terms of its usage areas 
and solutions. Based on these parameters, security 
precautions in communication layer of RFID technology do 
not prevent relay attacks occurred in the application layer 
NFC solutions. This study is conducted to prove relay attack 
practicability with using only mobile phones for relaying 
credentials instead of RFID based smart cards in an access 
control application. The Host Card Emulation (HCE) mode 
also eases relay attacks in NFC communication. The study 
explains the conceptual description of proposed relay attack, 
development and operating logic of mobile applications 
working based on card emulation mode and server software 
and also data communication basics between modules and 
web services descriptions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Daily communication devices such as computers, 
mobile phones etc. have evolved in the last decades in 
terms of both size and functionality. Although they are 
small in size, they became very capable devices in 
terms of performing complex and critical processes. 
This state is defined as the third era of computing [1] 
and named “Ubiquitous Computing” or “Pervasive 
Computing”. In this stage, standard computer 
perception changes both in appearance and logic. 
In the last decade, the communication and life style 
of people have completely changed. People have 
started to use smart mobile devices for their daily 
routines such as mailing, dealing with documents, 
entertaining etc. As a result, production and sales of 
smart mobile devices, mobile operating systems, 
mobile marketing and mobile solutions have extremely
increased. According to the research conducted by 
Collins, there are 7.3 billion mobile devices in the 
world which exceeds world population. These numbers 
also show the impacts of mobile ecosystem. 
Near Field Communication (NFC) technology is 
one of the communication conveniences that emerge 
from mobility tendency and device interaction concept. 
The main function of NFC is to establish connection 
between two mobile devices or NFC tags and reader. 
Data exchange or access requests can be easily 
performed with this concept. NFC enabled smart 
mobile devices are used in daily applications and create 
smart solutions. For example; NFC technology is used 
for contactless payments which are also the most 
popular NFC applications, loyalty couponing, transport 
systems (bus, train etc.), data exchange, gaming, 
location based services and access control systems. 
This paper has five sections: After introduction, 
Section 2 explains Near Field Communication basics 
and Section 3 includes literature review about the 
study. Relay attack is described in Section 4 and finally 
Section 5 concludes the paper with summary and 
possible future works of this study. 
II. NEAR FIELD COMMUNICATION
With the invention of mobile phones, the intent was 
to enable making voice calls via wireless instead of 
using traditional wired phones. After Second 
Generation (2G) GSM technology, mobile phones 
have been equipped with not only to perform voice but 
also to send/receive text messages and also to have 
internet experience capabilities. In addition to standard 
cellular network connection over base stations, mobile 
devices have started to establish connection to other 
electronic devices for data exchange and interaction. 
The infrared technology was used in first wireless 
communication trials, then Bluetooth and Wi-Fi 
wireless technologies have been developed for 
connection between interactive mobile devices. 
1) Basics of NFC 
After the studies of hardware developments, Near 
Field Communication (NFC) technology was 
introduced in 2002 by Philips and Nokia [3]. In 2004, 
NFC Forum was established in order to foster 
cooperation and standardization by Nokia, Microsoft, This study is supported by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey under 2211 program.
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Sony, and Philips. In early 2010s, NFC Forum has 
started to introduce NFC standards such as: Logical 
Link Control Protocol (LLCP) Specification, NFC 
Data Exchange Format (NDEF) Specification and 
NFC Record Type Definition (RTD) Specification etc. 
Then, mobile device manufacturers have been 
influenced from these developments and started to 
produce smart NFC products which are NFC enabled 
mobile devices, tags and readers. Finally, NFC became 
a standardized short range, easy to use and set up, 
flexible and stable communication technology.
NFC provides short range (up to a few centimeters) 
wireless communication between two electronic 
devices. In order to establish communication, at least 
one active (energy provider) device should initiate 
communication process. NFC enabled mobile devices 
and NFC readers such as contactless payment readers 
are active devices, whereas NFC tags and NFC posters 
are passive devices. 
NFC operates in 13.56 MHz High Frequency (HF) 
unlicensed frequency band that is available to all 
manufacturers with range of up to 4 cm. Data transfer 
rates of NFC are 106, 216 and up to 424 Kbps which is 
higher than RFID data transfer rates, however much 
lower than 3G and Wi-Fi rates. The reason of that is 
the main purpose of NFC operations is not transfer 
high volume data to destination. 
2) Operating modes of NFC 
NFC devices interact via three different modes 
according to application types and needs. This 
flexibility creates a customizable environment for 
developers and manufacturers. 
a) Peer-to-Peer Mode 
In Peer-to-Peer mode, two active NFC enabled 
mobile phones interact with each other in two 
directional data exchange paradigm. Firstly, one 
mobile device initiates communication set-up process 
using request-response mechanism, and other mobile 
device replies its response. The connection is 
established according to Logical Link Control Protocol 
Specification (LLCP) created by NFC Forum and data 
exchange is performed based on Simple NDEF 
Exchange Protocol (SNEP) protocol basics. The data, 
picture, URL exchange operations between two mobile 
devices use this mode of operation. 
b) Reader/Writer Mode  
Active mobile devices can both read and write 
passive NFC tags in Reader/Writer mode. Similar to 
RFID cards, NFC cards respond to requested data sent 
from initializer mobile device or write demanded data. 
Passive NFC tags are operated according to NDEF and 
RTD message format standards. Location based 
services, information tags or smart posters use this 
operation mode. 
c) Card Emulation Mode 
In this mode, two active NFC devices which are 
mobile device and reader are used. The mobile devices 
act as smart card based on ISO/IEC 14443 Type A, 
Type B and FeliCa standards in the application. When 
mobile phone gets close to reader, similar to RFID 
applications, reader initiates interaction and reaches 
mobile phone’s NFC module and Secure Element if 
available. Payment and Access Control applications 
use this mode for granting access. 
III. RELATED WORK
The Near Field Communication (NFC) technology 
is relatively a new technology which is introduced 
within the current decade [4]. The first versions of 
related standards have been released in last five years 
by NFC Forum and ISO [5], also device manufacturers 
have started to develop more NFC devices after these 
developments. 
After mobile payment systems have been launched 
especially after Google Wallet solution, the popularity 
of NFC has increased. As a result of this popularity, 
trials of practical attacks on mobile payments were 
conducted in research [6], [7] and [8]. These studies 
demonstrate the applicability of security problems in 
mobile payment domain. 
The implementations of NFC relay attack examples 
were conducted successfully in [6] and [7]. A mobile 
application installed on mobile device is used in 
attack; however, no security precautions are discussed 
in the study [9]. In the studies [6], [8] and [10], 
ISO/14443 based RFID cards were exposed to relay 
attack and successfully relayed. As countermeasures, 
protocols of distance bounding and Frame Waiting 
Time were offered in [6] and [8], however, they cannot 
provide sufficient precautions for attacks. 
In the ISO/14443 standard, Frame Waiting Time 
(FWT) is defined for standard smart card and reader 
communication. FWT variable defines maximum 
response time after the end of the reader’s data. FWT 
is defined as (256 · 16/ fcarrier)×2FWI , where FWI is 
a value from 0 (FWT = 300 μs) to 14 (FWT = 5 s) with 
a default of 4 (FWT = 4.8 ms). The control of this 
variable was offered in the literature for avoiding relay 
attack in [6] and [8]. This variable can be modified by 
attacker or some additional readers may be placed 
between reader and card in order to overcome this 
variable. However, the main reason of its unsuitability 
is that mobile devices are used in the proposed model 
instead of smart cards and when a relay attack 
occurred, only NFC based mobile phones 
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communicate with each other. There is no timing 
limitation between two NFC based mobile phone 
communications, because two devices are active not 
like in the ISO/14443 based passive cards. This 
problem should be solved with application layer 
security methods. 
Location based control is also offered as another 
countermeasure in the studies [8] and [11]. Distance-
bounding protocols use FWT values for calculating 
round trip time and finally comment on requester’s 
location. As it is mentioned, using FWT is not a
suitable solution for avoiding relay attacks especially 
where NFC enabled mobile device are used. These 
studies also show the significance of this research, 
because, it proves relay attack practicability with using 
only mobile phones for relaying credentials instead of 
RFID based smart cards and any other intermediate 
devices. 
IV. RELAY ATTACK
In addition to other security threats such as 
eavesdropping, data modifications etc. in the short 
range wireless communication, relay attacks are 
frequently used for performing interventions. 
Attacker captures and forwards relayed message to 
proxy device and this device delivers the message as if 
the real owner in a typical scenario. Similar to relay 
attacks, man in the middle attacks also influence 
wireless medium, however, the method and also 
purpose of relay attacks have completely changed. 
These attacks are frequently used in ISO/IEC14443 
based passive smart card communication environment. 
Since these cards are used in critical payment and 
access control systems, relay attacks in this 
environment result in important security threats. For 
example; in the research [7], ISO/IEC14443 based 
smart contactless credit card is successfully relayed 
over proxy devices. In this application, relay mobile 
phone records debit card data in reader mode and 
forwards this data to another phone via wireless 
communication such as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. Proxy 
NFC based mobile devices send credentials to reader 
as the real owner in card emulation mode. If the reader 
cannot detect the fake sender, relay attack is completed 
successfully. This activity flow is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
In the literature, NFC enabled mobile phones are 
generally used for relaying smart cards, in other words 
mobile phones read and send the data only. Credit 
cards, debit cards, and even electronic passports are 
used in relay attack experiences, however, in the 
access control systems proposal; mobile devices are 
used in card emulation mode instead of using smart 
cards. On the other hand, smart cards are limited and 
just reply the requested data 
A. Host Card Emulation Mode (HCE) 
NFC devices basically operate in three different 
implementation modes, Reader/Writer, Peer-to-Peer 
and Card Emulation mode. Although three modes are 
specified, developers could use only two of them, 
Reader/Writer and Peer-to-Peer in Android operating 
system because of Google policies. Only Google 
Wallet [12] application could use this operation mode 
for its transactions. With release of Android 4.4 (API 
Level 20), developers have started to use Host Card 
Emulation Mode [13] in their solutions and users have 
started to use their mobile phones like smart cards. We
have also moved to that operation mode in our system 
because of its functionality and flexibility compared to 
its other modes. 
The use of HCE in solutions also eases the 
practicability of relay attacks in the applications. 
Shifting between Reader and Card Emulation modes 
on same mobile device provides great chance to relay 
attackers instead of using different intermediate 
devices. HCE has also been used in practical relay 
attack scenario of the study. 
Figure 1. Typical Relay Attack scenario using contactless credit cards.
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B. Implementation 
The relay attack setup in this study shows 
differences in transaction methods and relaying 
medium. As it is illustrated in Fig 3, the high level 
components of NFC based access control systems are 
NFC Enabled mobile device, NFC reader, access 
control panel and central server. 
The general activity flow of NFC based access 
control system begins with controlling whether NFC 
unit of the mobile device is active or not. If NFC is 
enabled, user registers to the system with his/her 
mobile operator number, username etc. using 
application that is installed on the device. Once user is 
registered to the system, central server activates his/her 
account and sends activation key to authenticated 
mobile device. The activation key is checked based on 
predefined parameters. After registration process is 
completed successfully, user can now send access 
requests with his/her user name, password and 
expiration time of key parameters. 
After getting key from the server using JSON based 
web services infrastructure, user can now send 
authentication requests to NFC reader with acquired 
key.  At that time, relay phone can interfere NFC 
communication between reader and mobile phone. 
Relay phone can read the key that stored in the real 
mobile phone by getting close to phone in reader 
operation mode. In other words, relay phone imitates 
the NFC reader. If requester cannot identify the real 
NFC reader, relay phone gets the user key from real 
owner with operating peer-to-peer mode. 
In order to complete the attack successively, relay 
phone should send access request to NFC reader with 
the key that captured from real phone. In order to do 
that, relay phone shifts its operating mode to Host 
Card Emulation Mode, by doing this; it now acts as a
smart card and sends requests. These processes are 
illustrated in Figure 4. After these transactions, NFC 
reader gets the key and forwards to the server. Because 
of the validity of the key, unauthorized attempt can
access to resource. 
Figure 2. Screenshots of mobile application 
Figure 3. NFC Relay Attack scenario for access control system
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The whole process is illustrated in Figure 3. In the 
attack environment, relay phone has no wireless 
connection to server; therefore any key exchange 
occurred between server and relay phone. It captured 
the key from user mobile device using peer-to-peer 
operating mode and then changed its mode to card 
emulation mode. After this change, it created a virtual 
smart card using captured key from user device and 
requested access. NFC reader, access control panel and 
central server could not realize the relayed mobile 
device and attack is successively performed. 
In a typical relay attack scenario which is also 
illustrated in the Figure 1, at least two mobile devices 
are used for relaying credentials. However, in this 
study, only one mobile device performs attack with the 
help of ability of switching operating modes of NFC. 
This is the main originality of the study. Also this 
convenience provides flexibility to attackers, because, 
in this kind of environments, attackers do not need to 
place between devices physically at the same time. 
Once he captures the credentials from real phone in 
reader mode, then he can use them another time after 
switching NFC mode to card emulation mode. Critical 
part of this type of relay attacks is whether relayed 
sender mobile device is detected or not by reader 
during authentication. 
V. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
Practical and successful relay attack scenario on 
mobile device using card emulation mode and its 
implementation steps are described in this study. NFC 
is a relatively new and popular wireless communication 
technology especially on mobile devices and used in 
critical solutions frequently. As well as its 
functionality, it is exposed to the relay attacks. Because 
of inheritance from RFID standards, the proposed 
precautions of communication layer such as defining 
FWI for transactions between receiver and transmitter 
do not prevent relay attacks in NFC environment. The 
study proves NFC communication security gap in 
access control systems using mobile devices. This type 
of relay attacks occur in the application layer, therefore, 
the real-time precautions that work on this layer and 
able to detect real sender should be developed for 
prevention as a future work. 
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